ASBCA:
Sexual Harassment Legal Fees and Settlement Costs Are Recoverable
By John N. Ford, Cherry, Bekaert &
Holland, L.L.P. (CB&H)
Email: jford@cbh.com
In Tecom, Inc., ASBCA No. 53,884 and
54461 (September 21, 2007), the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals held that legal fees and settlement costs incurred by Tecom
in regard to a sexual harassment lawsuit were allowable cost on
Tecom’s government contracts.
While this decision is consistent with earlier ASBCA decisions regarding
such costs, it is significant in that it clarifies the “very
little likelihood of success on the merits” test that the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted for certain litigation
costs in Boeing North American, Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). Moreover, this decision should go a long way in deterring
the DCAA from questioning litigation costs incurred in other types
of litigation, particularly where there has been a settlement.
During the performance of a family housing maintenance contract
at Fort Hood in Texas, a former Tecom employee, who had worked on
the contract, filed a sexual harassment suit against Tecom pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ultimately, this lawsuit
was settled with Tecom incurring over $96,000 in legal fees and
agreeing to pay the former employee a settlement of $50,000, no
part of which included back pay, which would have been unallowable
under FAR 31.205-6(h)(1). Tecom did not admit to any wrongdoing
in the settlement agreement or the lawsuit.
After the settlement was approved by the U.S. District Court, Tecom
submitted a request for reimbursement for its legal fees and settlement
costs. In this letter, Tecom asserted that the harassment complaints
were untrue, and that it would have cost at least twice as much
to try the case as to settle it. Therefore, Tecom made a prudent
business decision to settle the case without any admission of culpability.
After a number of letters were exchanged over several months regarding
these costs, Tecom converted its request for payment into a claim.
A year later, Tecom filed its appeal with the ASBCA after the contracting
officer had not taken action on its claim.
On appeal, relying on the Boeing case mentioned above, the government
took the position that for Tecom to prevail, the company had to
demonstrate that the former employee had very little likelihood
of succeeding had the lawsuit gone to trial. This argument was based
on FAR 31.205-47(c)(2) and 31.204. Additionally, the government
argued that the settlement costs were not allowable in any event
as they were “related” to penalties which are expressly
unallowable under FAR 31.205-15.
The Board rejected both these arguments. In regard to the “little
likelihood of success” argument the Board stated:
"In the instant appeal, the parties in their cross-motions
for summary judgment merely seek our determination as to whether
the Boeing standard for allowability applies to the costs in question,
and whether appellant must show that the former employee/plaintiff
in
the sexual harassment lawsuit against appellant had “very
little likelihood of success on the merits” as asserted by
the government. We hold that it does not. The litigation in question
did not involve a criminal prosecution; did not require a finding,
absent a settlement, of contractor liability based on fraud or similar
misconduct or imposition of a monetary penalty where the proceeding
did not involve an allegation of fraud or similar misconduct; or
did not require a final decision by an appropriate official of an
executive agency to disbar or suspend appellant, or to rescind or
void the contract, or to terminate the contract for default by reason
of the contractor’s violation or failure to comply with a
law or regulation. Accordingly, we hold that FAR 31.205-47 does
not present an allowability bar to appellant’s recovery of
its legal costs, as part of its reimbursement of G&A, in defending
the lawsuit filed by its former employee." Thus, the Board
interpreted the Boeing standard of “little likelihood of success”
as applying only to litigation related to the types of proceedings
specifically identified in FAR 31.205-47.
Turning to the question of whether the settlement costs were related
to the “penalties” aspect of FAR 31.205-15, the Board
looked to Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dalton, 119 F.3d 972 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) to determine the essential characteristics of a penalty.
In doing so, it noted that a cost should be considered a penalty
if:
(1) the costs imposed are unrelated to the amount of actual harm
suffered and are related more to the penalized party’s conduct;
(2) the proceeds from the infractions are collected by the state,
rather than paid to the individual harmed; and (3) the statute is
meant to address a harm to the public, as opposed to remedying a
harm to an individual. Applying this test, the Board determined
that the settlement costs were not “penalties.”
Taking the lessons learned from Tecom, the allowability of attorney
fees and related litigation costs will generally be governed by
FAR 31.205-33. Under this provision, legal fees are generally allowable
if they are adequately supported by billing information from the
attorney. In this regard, paragraph (f) of the cost principles states
that “[f]ees for services rendered are allowable only when
supported by evidence of the nature and scope of the service furnished."
It goes on to require contractors to produce the details of all
agreements, such as engagement letters, with the attorney, showing
the work requirements, rate of compensation, and the nature and
amount of other expenses to be covered by the agreement.
The provision also requires that invoices or billings submitted
by the attorney include “sufficient detail as to time expended
and nature of the actual services provided.” This latter point
is significant as legal bills often will contain items that merely
state such things as “telephone call client” with no
identification of the matter to which the call related. This type
of entry makes it almost impossible for the government, particularly
a DCAA auditor, to determine if the time charged for that item is
allowable. Accordingly, you should request all outside professionals
who are covered by FAR 31.205-33 to provide fairly detailed information
in their bills or invoices if you hope to recover those costs on
government contracts.
One exception to the general allowability of attorney fees is found
in FAR 31.205-30, Patent costs. The costs of general patent counseling
are allowable. However, other patent costs, including the cost of
patent litigation, except that undertaken at the direction or request
of the government or in fulfillment of the requirements of a government
contract are unallowable.
John is a Senior Government Contracting
Consultant with CB&H and a member of the Firm's Government Contractor
Services Group.